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Abstract
In this paper we examine the effect of convertible debt on the investment
incentives facing stockholders. The effect depends critically on the value of existing
assets relative to the firm's investment requirements. With a restrictive dividend
covenant, convertible debt mitigates the overinvestment incentive associated with risky
debt but exacerbates the underinvestment incentive at higher values of existing assets.
A less-restrictive dividend covenant exacerbates overinvestment under straight debt
financing but reduces the underinvestment incentive induced by the conversion
feature. In this context, a convertible debt contract with a less-restrictive dividend
covenant maximizes firm value.
I. Introduction
The agency relation between bondholders and stockholders induces
suboptimal investments. These costs can be broadly classified as an under-
investment problem (Myers (1977)) and an overinvestment or risk-shifting
problem (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). A substantial body ofliterature addresses
the mitigation of these problems with different bond indenture provisions. How-
ever, the effect of a conversion feature on the firm's investment incentives
remains unresolved. For example, Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1980) assert that
the conversion feature mitigates the underinvestment problem, while Smith and
Warner (1979) suggest that it exacerbates the underinvestment problem. Green
(1984), abstracting from the underinvestment problem, shows that a conversion
feature mitigates the overinvestment incentive.
In this paper we study the effect of convertible debt on both potential
underinvestment and overinvestment. We use financial slack to determine the
effect of the conversion feature on investment incentives. Whether convertible
15
16 The Journal of Financial Research
debt induces underinvestment or overinvestment depends critically on the level
of financial slack generated by existing assets.
In particular, convertible debt is analogous to straight debt with an
embedded call option. The debt component of these securities creates incentives
to overinvest or underinvest. The embedded call option can induce the firm's
managers to reduce risk (e.g., see Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1985)), thereby
mitigating the overinvestment incentive and possibly exacerbating the under-
investment incentive.' However, the call option's effect depends on the value of
assets in place (or financial slack). When bondholders convert, they lose their
seniority over other claimants. Without financial slack, new securities issued to
finance the investment opportunity dilutes the call option value. Thus, as financial
slack from existing assets increases and the reliance on external financing
decreases, the option's value and its resulting effect increase.
Convertible debt is also analogous to outside equity with a put option. As
the value of existing assets increases, this put option loses value and convertible
debt behaves like equity. As a result, the conversion feature's effect on the firm's
investment incentive is nonmonotonic with the performance of existing assets.
The above relation between the investment incentives of convertible debt
and the performance of assets in place depends on a restrictive dividend
constraint. While a dividend restriction generally reduces the agency costs of
straight debt, a less-restrictive dividend constraint mitigates the underinvestment
incentive of convertibie debt. This is because a dividend payment can induce
voluntary conversion, thereby eliminating the underinvestment problem. For this
reason, convertible debt with a less-restrictive dividend constraint dominates
straight debt with either dividend constraint.
II. Assumptions and Notation
Our analysis adapts the methodology in John (1987) and assumes a three-
date (two-period) world. All participants costiessly receive the same information.
Today (at time 0), the firm's value consists of the value of existing assets and the
value of a single investment opportunity. One period in the future (at time 1), the
existing assets generate a stochastic cash flow, X > 0, and the investment
opportunity expires. If accepted, the investment opportunity requires an initial
outlay of I, and generates cash flow at time 2 of H or L, where H> I> L > 0.
The state, e, revealed at time I defines pee), the probability that the
growth option will return H (0 < pee) < 1). Upon observing pee) and X, the
manager acting in the stockholders' interest decides whether to accept or reject
'Green (1984) demonstrates that the conversion feature mitigates the overinvestment incentive. However,
Green abstracts from Myers's (1977) underinvestment problem and ignores the effect of assets in place, thus
ignoring financial slack.
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The firm issues either straight
or convertible debt maturing
at time 2.
The firm has assets in place
yielding cash flow at time I.
The firm has an option to
to invest at time I in a
growth opportunity paying
off cash flow at time 2.
The cash flow from the assets in place
is realized.
The net present value of the
investment option is realized.
The manager makes the investment
decision.
The firm issues new securities
to finance the investment if necessary.
The cash flow from the
investment option is
realized.
The firm is liquidated.
Figure I. Sequence of Events in the Two-period Model.
the investment opportunity. We suppress the state notation so that p represents the
probability of H conditional on state e. Figure I summarizes the sequence of
events.
The firm finances the investment internally to the extent possible. Any
excess cash flow is invested in a zero net present value (NPV) project. This
assumption is equivalent to a dividend constraint limiting the dividend to a
constant amount regardless of the firm's cash flow.' The firm finances any
shortfall with zero coupon subordinate debt with promised payment F, payable
at time 2.3 Finally, at time 2, the cash flow from the investment is revealed, the
firm is liquidated, and all claims are settled.
We also assume:
A1. risk neutrality and a zero time value of money;
A2. frictionless capital markets except for costly recontracting;
A3. the firm's capital structure initially contains equity and risky, zero-
coupon straight or convertible debt, each with promised payment
M payable at time 2;4 and
A4. strictly enforced me-first rules.
'The effect of relaxing this constraint is discussed in section IV.
'The assumption of issuing subordinated debt is simplifying. The important results would not be affected
if the firm issued equity to finance the investment.
'The model abstracts from the issue of why a firm should want to issue debt. A tax motivation (e.g., see
Heinkel and Zechner (1990)), could provide such a motive. However, tax effects obscure the intuition. A
derivation of the model in the presence of taxes is available from the authors on request.
18 The Journal of Financial Research
Assumption Al allows the value of a security to be represented by the
expected value of the cash flows to its owners.' Assumption A2 focuses the
analysis on the agency problem. Once issued, securities cannot be costlessly
extinguished by the firm, and participants cannot costlessly negotiate away
conflicts. If recontracting were costless, the firm's capital structure decision would
not affect stockholders' wealth. Assumption A3 focuses on the conversion feature.
The convertible debt can be converted into equity at the option of the
bondholders. The debt's dilution factor is defined as y; upon conversion, the
bondholders receive y proportion of the firm's equity. Assumption A4 requires
that a security issued at time 1 be subordinate to the existing debt.
III. Investment Decision Under Alternative Capital Structures
We examine the investment decision under three initial financing
arrangements. The first is the optimal investment strategy under all-equity
financing. This case simply demonstrates the general methodology. An all-equity
capital structure eliminates the agency problem since the firm chooses the value
maximizing investment strategy. The second and third arrangements incorporate
the effects of existing straight debt and convertible debt, respectively, on the
firm's investment decision. The investment decision depends on two factors:
1. the information, p, X, revealed at time 1; and
2. the firm's initial financing.
Define p; as the minimal probability of H, at which the investment will be
accepted (given X) under financing arrangement i (i = e, S, c). Then, p; character-
izes the investment strategy under alternative financing arrangements.
Let p' represent the investment decision to invest if the project's NPV is
nonnegative. Then, p* is the solution to:
pH + (1 - p)L - I = 0 (1)
Comparing p; with p' gives the effect of the initial financing decision on the
firm's investment incentive. Investment decisions characterized by p; > p' repre-
sent underinvestment. That is, the firm rejects positive NPV investment oppor-
tunities in states where p; ~ p > p', Alternatively, p; < p' represents
'The analysis could be generalized to account for positive time value of money and risk aversion. Then, the
probabilities of the growth opportunity returning H or L denoted as PH and PI., respectively, would represent
state-contingent prices. The sum ofPH and PI. would equal I/(l + r), where r is the risk-free rate. While this
change requires subsequent expressions to incorporate the state-contingent prices, the central results regarding
the role of the conversion feature are unchanged.
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overinvestment. In this case, the firm accepts negative NPV investment
opportunities in states where p; .:::, p < p* (see John (1987)).
Optimal Investment Strategy for an All-Equity Firm
First, consider the case where the investment outlay exceeds the cash flow
from existing assets. The firm finances the shortfall (I - X) with proceeds from
a new debt issue with promised payment F. The investment decision can be
described by the rationality constraint:
pF + (1 - p)MIN[L,F] = I - X
and the investment criterion:
p(H - F) + (1 - p)MAX[L - F,O] ~ X
(2)
(3)
Equation (2) ensures that the market value of the new debt equals the
needed funds. Expression (3) ensures that the expected cash flow to the
stockholders from accepting the project is at least as large as the equity value if
the firm rejects the project.
The solution to the equality in (3), subject to equation (2), characterizes
the investment decision for a pure equity-financed firm, as given in equation (4):
p: = (I - L)/(H - L) (4)
The optimal investment strategy when the firm has sufficient internal
funds to invest in the project, (X ~ 1), is the solution to (5):
or,
p(H + X - 1) + (1 - p)[L + X - 1] = X
p: = (I - L)/(H - L)
(5)
Notice that the optimal investment strategy is independent of X. This strategy is
the value-maximizing decision: invest as long as the investment opportunity has
a nonnegative NPV (i.e., p: = pO).
Effect of the Conversion Feature on Investment Incentives
The effect ofthe conversion feature depends on the magnitude of the cash
flow from existing assets. We analyze the investment incentive both when the
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firm's cash flow is insufficient to finance the investment and when its cash flow
is greater than the investment outlay.
Investment Incentives with External Financing. Proposition 1 describes the
effect of the conversion feature when the firm uses external funds to finance the
investment.
PROPOSITION 1. Let X. = I - [(I - L)(H - M)/(H - L)) be the value ofX that
induces a value-maximizing investment strategy for both straight and convertible
debt. Let Z = [M(I - M)/y(H - M)) + M(H - I)/(H - M) be the threshold value
ofX below which the conversion option is valueless at p;. Then, for 0 :5: X < X.,
the investment incentives are such that p; = p; > p', and both straight and
convertible debt induce underinvestment. For X. < X < Z, the investment
incentives are such that p.; = p; < p', and both straight and convertible debt
induce overinvestment. For Z < X < 1, the investment incentives are such that
p,; < p', p,; < p; ~ p', and straight debt induces overinvestment but convertible
debt mitigates the incentive and can cause underinvestment.
Proof1. For straight debt financing, if the firm rejects the investment opportunity
the equity value will be MAX[X - M;O]. Therefore, the firm accepts the project
if and only if the rationality constraint (6) and investment criterion (7) are
satisfied."
pF= I - X
p(H - M - F) ~ MAX[X - M,O]
(6)
(7)
Solving equation (6) subject to the equality in (7) gives the optimal investment
strategy p; as:
p; (I - X)/(H - M) for °:5: X < M
(I - M)/(H - M) for M:5: X < 1 (8)
For convertible debt financing, if the firm rejects the project, convertible
bondholders receive MAX[yX, MIN(X,M)] , Thus, the stockholders' claim is
{X - MAX[yX, MIN(X,M)]}. The firm accepts the project only if the cash flow
to equity holders exceeds this amount.
"Note that the new bondholders are paid only if the project generates H, since the initial debt is risky (i.e.,
M> L),
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Figure II. The Relation Between the Cash Flow from Existing Assets and the Value of a Conversion
Feature. Figure IIa plots the face value of subordinated debt F issued to finance the investment opportunity,
requiring an investment / against the cash flows from existing assets X. Figure lIb plots the conversion value
at the minimum probability of accepting the project (p;). At Zthe conversion value equals the promised payment
M, conditional on the firm's growth opportunities' yielding H. The conversion ratio is denoted by y.
Notice that the cash flow to outstanding equity at time 2 depends on the
bondholders' conversion decision. Their decision depends on the promised pay-
ment to the new security holders, since the payment dilutes the conversion value.
That is, the optimal conversion strategy is a function of the promised payment to
new bondholders F. This promised payment must be large enough to finance the
shortfall, I - X. Thus, the promised payment varies inversely with X. Figure I1(a)
gives the value of the promised payment (computed for p;) as a function of X.
Figure I1(b) relates the conversion value to these promised payments.
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Notice that Z is defined as the point at which the conversion value
y(H - F) equals the promised payment M, and bondholders are indifferent
between converting and redeeming. Any value ofX less (greater) than Z leads to
redemption (conversion) at the minimum investment probabilityp;. Consequently,
the equity value conditional on the firm's taking the project is
p(H - M - F) for 0 ~ X < Z
in the redemption region, and
p(1 - y)(H - F) for Z ~ X < I
in the conversion region. Stockholders accept the project as long as:
pMIN[(1 - y)(H - F),(H - M - F)] ~ {X - MAX[yX,MIN(X,M)]} (9)
Thus, the optimal investment strategy is p;, the solution to the equality in (9)
subject to (6). This solution is:"
(1 - X)/(H - M)
(1 - M)/(H - M)
for X< M
for M~X< Z
[I - y(1 - X) - M]/H(1 - y) for Z ~ X < I (10)
Comparing the investment strategy under convertible debt in (10) with that under
straight debt in (8) yields the relations in Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
Notice that convertible debt has the same effect as straight debt for cash-
flow levels below the threshold level Z (see Figure III). Over this region the
conversion option has no value so that convertible debt behaves as if it were
straight debt. For cash-flow levels above Z, the conversion option becomes
valuable. Increasing risk raises this option value, transferring wealth to the
convertible bondholders. This mitigates the overinvestment incentive. The extent
of this mitigation increases with the cash-flow level X. In fact, for large values
of y and X; the conversion option can induce underinvestment. This phenomenon
is studied in detail in the next section.
'This solution assumes that yX < M for Z < X < J. If yX > M, then p'e = X/(H + X-/). This is an
increasing function of X, as is the function in the text.
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Figure III. Optimal Investment Strategies for Convertible Debt (P;) and Straight Debt (P;) as a Function
of the Cash Flows from Existing Assets X. The firm has a growth opportunity requiring an investment! to pay
H or L with probability p and (1 - p), respectively. The promised payment to the debt holders is M. An optimal
investment strategy is characterized by the minimum probability of H at which the project is accepted by
stockholders. A firm-value-maximizing strategy is given by p',
Investment Incentives withAl! Internal Financing. Proposition 2 describes
the effect of the conversion feature when the growth opportunity is internally
financed.
PROPOSITION 2. Define
Xb M - L + 1, the minimum level ofcash flow at which the debt is
default free;
Xc Mfy, the level of cash flow beyond which the convertible
bondholders convert at time 1 if the investment is rejected; and
Xd Mfy + (I - L), the level of cash flow beyond which the
convertible bondholders always convert at time 2.
Then, for I ~ X < X b, P; < p', p; < p; ~ p', and straight debt induces
overinvestment but convertible debt mitigates the incentive and can cause under-
investment. For X b < X < Xc, p; > p; = p', convertible debt induces
underinvestment, and p'c is an increasing convex function ofX For Xc < X < X d,
p; > P.: = p', convertible debt induces underinvestment, and p; is a decreasing
function ofX For Xd < X; p; = p; = p', and both debt contracts induce firm-
value-maximizing strategy.
Proof2. First, consider the investment decision under straight debt financing. The
firm undertakes the project if
p[H + (X - 1) - M] + (1 - p)MAX[L+ (X -1) - M,O] ~ MAX[X - M,O] (11)
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The solution to the equality in (11) gives the optimal investment strategy under
straight debt financing as
*P, (X - M)/(H - M) for X=]
(X - M)/(H + X - ] - M) for] < X < X b
(1 - L)/(H - L) for Xb < X (12)
Now, consider the investment decision under convertible debt financing.
Absent the investment, the conversion decision can be characterized as
MAX[yX;MIN(X;M)]. The equity value is equal to X - MAX[yX;MIN(X;M)].
Therefore, the firm invests if
p(1 - y)(H + X -1) + (1 - p)[L + X -] - MAX{y(L + X -1),MIN[L + X -],M])]
;::: X-MAX{yX,MIN[X,M]} (13)
The solution to the equality in (13) gives the optimal investment strategy
under convertible debt financing as
*Pc (X - M)/(1 - y)(H + X - 1)
(1 - L)/[(1 - y)H - y(X - 1) + M - L]
for] s X < Xb (14a)
for X b < X < Xc (14b)
(1 - yX - L + M)/[(1 - y)H - y(X - 1) + M - L] for Xc < X < Xd (14c)
(1 - L)/(H - L) for x, <X (14d)
Over the range] < X < Xc, bondholders convert only if the firm accepts the
project and the project yields H. For values ofX between ~. and Xd, bondholders
convert if the firm rejects the project or if the firm accepts the project and the
project yields H. Beyond X, conversion always occurs. Notice that p; is an
increasing concave function of X in (14a), an increasing convex function ofX in
(14b), and a decreasing function ofXin (14c). Comparing equations (14a-d) with
(12) gives the relations stated in Proposition 2. Q.E.D.
Without additional external financing (i.e., X;::: 1), the existing straight
debt induces overinvestment but not underinvestment. As the assets generate
greater cash flow, the straight debt becomes less risky, reducing the
overinvestment incentive. Over the range X ;::: X b, the straight debt is risk free,
establishing a value-maximizing investment strategy, p',
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Since convertible debt is equivalent to equity with a put option, it
mitigates the overinvestment incentive and can induce underinvestment. If the
project is accepted and yields L, the expiration value of the put option, P(X>, is
given by
P(X> = MAX[O,MIN(X - 1+ L,M) - y(X - 1+ L)]
This can be rewritten as
P(X> = (1 - y)(X - 1+ L) for X<Xb
M - y(X - I + L) for Xb < X < Xd
= ° for X> Xd
(15)
(16a)
(16b)
(16c)
For X <Xd, convertible bondholders exercise their put option. Notice that
P(X> is a nonmonotonic function ofX. When the investment pays L, and for very
low values of cash flow in (16a), the firm defaults on the promised payment to
bondholders. As the cash flow increases within this range, bondholders recover
more. Therefore, the value of the put option increases with X; reaching a
maximum of M at X = Xb• As X continues to increase over the range in (16b), the
put option loses value. At the same time, stockholders risk losing their share of
the increasingly valuable asset, X. Finally, for X> X, in (16c), the put option
becomes worthless. In this range, bondholders always convert. Convertible debt
is equivalent to equity, inducing a value-maximizing investment strategy. The
interaction of the risk assumed by stockholders and the value accrued to the put
option when the firm accepts or rejects the project explains the curvature of the
function p;' over the range I < X < Xd in Figure III.
In summary, investing tends to increase the put option value, inducing
underinvestment." However, if the cash flow from existing assets is sufficiently
high, conversion always occurs and convertible debt behaves like equity.
IV. Dividend Constraints and the Optimal Debt Contract
Up to this point, the model requires that the firm retain any internally
generated funds exceeding the investment outlay. This assumption is equivalent
8The analysis assumes that the cash flow from existing assets, X, is uncorrelated with the profitability of the
investment opportunity, p. If, however, X and p are positively correlated, underinvestment is mitigated or
avoided. Thus, firms with growth opportunities consisting of potential expansion of existing operations are more
likely to issue convertible debt.
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to assuming fixed dividend payments regardless of the firm's cash flow. We now
examine the effect of a less-restrictive (conditional) dividend constraint.
Conditional Dividend Constraint
The conditional dividend constraint allows the firm to payout all
internally generated funds greater than the investment outlay. Specifically, this
dividend constraint requires that an interim dividend, paid at time 1, be no greater
than MAX[X - 1,0].9 For the project to be accepted, the dividend plus the ex-
dividend equity value must at least equal the equity value if the project is
rejected. For outstanding straight debt, this investment strategy can be
characterized by expression (17) for X> I.
(X - f) + p(H - M) ;::: MAX[X - M,O] (17)
Solving (17) for all values of X > 1 gives the optimal investment strategy as
p: = [I - M]/[H - M]
Comparing this expression with equation (12) shows that the less-restrictive
constraint induces more overinvestment (see also Kalay (1982), John and Kalay
(1985), Berkovitch and Kim (1990». Thus, under straight debt financing a
restrictive dividend constraint dominates a conditional dividend constraint.
However, under convertible debt financing the interim dividend can
induce voluntary conversion and influence the firm's investment decision.
Proposition 3 characterizes the dilution factor y and the dividend constraint that
eliminates the perverse investment incentives, given internal financing of the
growth opportunity.
PROPOSITION 3. Define the first-best strategy as accept all positive NPV projects
and reject all negative NPV projects (i.e., the strategy p'). Given H, L, 1, and p,
and given that X > 1, a convertible bond contract with promised payment M, a
conditional dividend constraint, and a dilution factor,
y = [M(H - L) - L(H - I)]I[H(I - L)] induces a first-best investment strategy.
Proof 3. Given in the Appendix.
'Although the firm has the option of paying less than allowed by the constraint, in the absence of taxes,
transaction costs, and stockholder/manager conflicts, risky debt induces the firm to pay the maximum dividend
allowed under the constraint.
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Notice that y is chosen so that the finn's optimal investment strategy is
first best when X = 1. The optimal investment strategy when X> I depends on the
bondholders' decision to convert at time 1. Given that 't equals the value given
in Proposition 3, the dividend induces conversion for X ~ Mfy. This leads to a
first-best strategy since the convertible bond behaves like equity. On the other
hand, if X < Mfy, the bondholders convert only when p is very high.
Nevertheless, the proof shows that the manager's strategy remains first best
regardless of the decision to convert. For X < I there is no interim dividend and
the analysis is the same as in section III. Thus, a conditional dividend constraint
dominates a restrictive dividend constraint under convertible debt financing.
Optimal Debt Contract
The financing problem involves a choice of a dilution factor and a
dividend constraint that maximizes current finn value. From the previous section,
the firm will choose between convertible debt with a conditional dividend
constraint and straight debt with a restrictive dividend constraint.
PROPOSITION 4. Convertible debt with a promised payment M, a dilution factor
y = [M(H - L) - L(H -l))/[H(I - L)}, and a conditional dividend constraint
dominates straight debt with a restrictive dividend constraint.
Proof 4. Compare the optimal investment strategy under convertible debt as
described in Proposition 4 with that under straight debt with a restrictive dividend
covenant. According to Proposition 3, for Z < X < Xb, P: < p; s p'. In this region
of X, convertible debt mitigates overinvestment. For all other values of X, both
debt contracts induce identical investment strategies. Therefore, convertible debt
dominates straight debt. Q.E.D.
v. Conclusions
In this paper we show that firms with convertible debt reduce the level
of investment compared with those with straight debt in the presence of restrictive
dividend covenants. Convertible debt then either mitigates the overinvestment
problem or exacerbates the underinvestment problem. When the firm's existing
assets generate low cash flow, convertible debt behaves like straight debt,
inducing the same incentives. However, when existing assets generate moderately
high cash flow, convertible debt with a restrictive dividend constraint dilutes the
shareholders' stake in the new investment and creates an underinvestment
problem. As the cash flow from existing assets increases further, convertible debt
behaves like equity and the agency problem disappears.
A less-restrictive dividend constraint mitigates the underinvestment
problem under convertible debt financing, but exacerbates the overinvestment
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problem under straight debt financing. A convertible debt contract with a less-
restrictive dividend covenant dominates straight debt financing, thereby
maximizing firm value.
Since convertible debt with a liberal dividend constraint is a dominating
contract, we should observe more liberal dividend covenants placed on convertible
debt as compared with straight debt. Furthermore, convertible debt should be
more prevalent in firms with high growth opportunities relative to assets in place.
Finally, the ratio (yfM) increases with the book value of the convertible debt (M).
Thus, we should find higher dilution ratios in firms that have risky growth
opportunities and risky debt outstanding.
Appendix
Proof 3. We show that p; = p* for all values of X > 1.
If the project is taken, the bondholder is indifferent between converting
the bond at time I and holding the bond for one more period, whenever
(AI)
where PJ denotes the probability of receiving H at which the bondholder is
indifferent to the timing of the conversion. If the project is not taken, the
bondholder converts at time I whenever the conversion value, yx, is greater than
M, i.e, X> Mfy.
We evaluate the manager's strategy when (i) X = I, (ii) I < X < Mfy, and
(iii) X ~ Mfy. The optimal investment strategy for X = I is given by equation
(l4a) in the text. Conditional on X = I, p; = p' if
y = [M(H - L) - L(H - 1)]f[H(I - L)] (A2)
For I < X < Mfy, if the project is not undertaken, bondholders do not
convert at time I and redeem their bonds at time 2. If the project is undertaken,
bondholders may convert at time I if p is sufficiently high. We consider
involuntary conversion and voluntary conversion.
Involuntary conversion occurs when p < PJ' Substituting (A2) into (AI)
shows that PJ > p' for I < X < Mfy. Thus, the optimal strategy is to invest when,
(X - 1) + p(l - y)H ~ MAX[O,X - M] (A3)
The solution to the equality in (A3) gives p; = p',
Voluntary conversion occurs when p > PJ' Since from (AI) PJ> p', it
follows that p > p', If bondholders convert, the optimal strategy is to invest if,
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(1 - y)(X -1) + (1 - y)fpH + (1 - p)L] ~ MAX[O,X - MJ
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This yields p; < p', which is inconsequential because the investment strategy
causes acceptance of only profitable projects since the realized p > p'.
For X~ M/y, bondholders convert at time I if the project is not accepted.
We derive the investment strategy under the assumption that bondholders convert
even if the project is accepted. We test the consistency of this assumption. The
manager's optimal strategy is to invest when,
(1 - y)(X - 1) + p(1 - y)H + (I - p)(1 - y)L ~ (1 - y)X
This yields p; = p', Consistency of the bondholder's decision to convert requires
that p; ~ Pl. From equations (AI) and (A2), we can show that p' ~ PI for
X ~ M/y and, therefore, p; ~ Pl.
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